Literature
The Debatable Strategy: Hitler’s Decision Not to Allow the 6th Army to Withdraw Under Erich von Manstein
The Debatability of Hitler’s Decision
In the annals of World War II, the decision by Adolf Hitler not to allow the 6th Army to withdraw under Erich von Manstein at Stalingrad stands as one of the most controversial choices of the war. Historical analysis and re-evaluation offer insights into the nuanced implications of this strategic decision, ultimately questioning whether the 6th Army could have been saved.
Manstein's Command and Expectations
Erich von Manstein, a skilled and talented military commander, was tasked with leading the Army Group Don (AG Don) with the objective of breaking through the encirclement at Stalingrad and relieving the besieged 6th Army. However, Hitler had other plans, and von Manstein was instructed to remain within the encirclement rather than attempting a breakout. This discrepancy between von Manstein's expectations and Hitler’s directives has been a subject of debate among military historians.
Manstein's public and private correspondences suggest a frustration with the command, stemming partly from a lack of clear directives and some suspicion that Hitler had no intention of allowing a breakout. However, von Manstein held back from directly questioning Hitler's orders, choosing to follow protocol instead of risking his position.
The Mechanics of a Potential Breakout
Had von Manstein been given the directive to break into the encirclement, the potential for a successful breakout existed up until December 8, 1942. By this date, however, the chances of a successful operation were diminishing rapidly due to the increasing pressure from the Soviet forces. Many historians argue that a earlier breakout would have had a higher chance of success as it would have permitted better organization and coordination of the forces involved.
Source Material: Heinrich Gerlach and Peter Lewis
The detailed and critical historical analysis in the book, 'Breakout at Stalingrad,' by Heinrich Gerlach and Dr. Peter Lewis, offers substantial insights into the situation. As staff officers, they provide a semi-autobiographical account that sheds light on the fighting and the eventual capture of the 6th Army. This account not only complements but also stands alongside The Forgotten Soldier by Régis Sager, which is highly regarded in its own right.
'Breakout at Stalingrad' is an essential read for anyone seeking a nuanced understanding of the events at Stalingrad. Gerlach and Lewis’s approach to the subject matter is meticulous and their insights are invaluable.
The Fate of the 6th Army
Despite the potential for a breakout, the reality on the ground was that the 6th Army was already in a dire situation by the time von Manstein took command. The immobility of the army, exacerbated by the harsh winter conditions, meant that any attempt to move would have been extremely challenging. Von Manstein issued the withdrawal order because he did not want to be held responsible for the inevitable destruction of the 6th Army. The high command in Berlin was also aware of the impossibility of relief for the encircled units, and thus gave little hope or support to the 6th Army.
Conclusion
The decision not to allow the 6th Army to withdraw under Erich von Manstein underlines the complex nature of military command during World War II. While historical analysis continues to challenge and re-evaluate this decision, it remains a critical moment in history worth examining. The story of the 6th Army and its tragic fate at Stalingrad is a testament to the significant impact of strategic choices on the course of the war.
Further Reading
For a more detailed exploration of the topic, consider the following resources:
Breakout at Stalingrad (2008) by Heinrich Gerlach and Dr. Peter Lewis
The Forgotten Soldier (1974) by Régis Sager
The Battle for Stalingrad: Terrible Combat UK:1942-43 by Edrek Murawski